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The State of Utah, as amicus curiae, files this brief in
support of Appellant Box Elder County.

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78-2(a)-3(j)(1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
AND INTENT OF AMICUS CURIAE
The State of Utah files this amicus curiae brief to address
whether operation of Utah Code Ann. sections 27-12-89 and -90
(1995) results in an unconstitutional taking of property without
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution.

"Issues regarding the constitutionality of a statute are

questions of law which we review for correctness, affording no
particular deference to the trial court's rulings.

Ryan v. Gold

Cross Servs.f Inc.f 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995); Mountain Fuel
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988).
A statute is presumed constitutional, and "we resolve any reasonable

doubts

in

favor

of

constitutionality.•

Society

of

Separationistsr Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993)."
Board of Comm'rsr Utah State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263, 126667 (Utah 1997).

While not explicitly stated in Respondents' brief,

Respondents appear to be challenging Utah Code Ann. section 27-1289—both facially and as applied.

"Facial invalidity can only be

found if a statute is ""incapable of any valid application."*"
1

State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 466 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting

Greenwood Vt City of North Salt Late/ 817 p.2d 816, 819 (Utah
1991)) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974);

State Vt Archamfreau, 820 p.2d 920, 927 (Utah App. 1991))).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend. V:

M

[N]or shall private property be taken

for public use, without just compensation."
Utah Const, art. I, § 22: "Private property for public use.
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation."
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (1995):
dedication.

"Public use constituting

A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and

abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously
used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years."
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-90 (1995): "Highways once established
continue until abandoned.

All public highways once established

shall continue to be highways until abandoned or vacated by order
of the highway authorities having jurisdiction over any such
highway, or by other competent authority."

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Implementation of Utah Code Ann. sections 27-12-89 and -90
(1995) does not unconstitutionally take property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution or article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution.

2

The United States Supreme Court has held that a statute similar to
these two provisions of the Utah Code did not constitute a "taking"
under the Fifth Amendment.
The provisions do not create a "taking" under article If
section 22 because a party claiming a "taking" must first demonstrate

a

protectable

property

interest,

and

then

that

the

protectable property interest was "taken." Appellees have not and
cannot meet either prong of the test.

They have forfeited their

protectable property interest by their inaction.

Moreover, the

requirement under the provisions of the Utah Code that a court must
find that property has been "dedicated and abandoned" before a
public thoroughfare may be created logically precludes a court from
finding that a "taking" has occurred.
occurs under the statute.

No direct governmental action

This distinguishes this statute from

laws that have been held to violate the Fifth Amendment.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THIS COURT HAS POUND ENTIRELY WITHOUT MERIT
THE CLAIM THAT SECTION 27-12-89 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
TAKING OP PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION
Appellees1
unconstitutional
without merit.

claim that
takings

sections

27-12-89

of property without

and

-90 create

compensation

is

The State has chosen to focus its amicus brief on

section 27-12-89. If it is valid, section 27-12-90 cannot possibly
be invalid.
Section 27-12-89 functions, for all intents and purposes, as
a statute of limitations. "In general, statutes of limitations are
3

intended to compel the exercise of a right of action within a
reasonable time and to suppress stale and fraudulent claims. . . ."
Hortop

3L* Goldminer' s

1989)(citation omitted).

Daughterr

785

P. 2d

1087 ,

1091

(Utah

Similarly, section 27-12-89 requires a

landowner to exercise her property right to exclude the public
within a ten-year period or be subject to a finding that the road
has been dedicated and abandoned to the public.

Thus, a typical

statute of limitations and section 27-12-89 recognize that a
limitation should be placed upon the time that a person has to
assert a right.

"State legislatures possess the discretion to

enact statutes of limitations and these statutes are presumptively
constitutional." AVJg Vt Bflt Qf Review Qf Indus. ComTO'H/ 837 P.2d
584, 587 (Utah App. 1992)(citation omitted).1
statutes are presumed constitutional.1"

Moreover, ""all

Campbell v. Campbellf 896

P.2d 635, 640 (Utah App. 1995)(citations omitted).

In an earlier

case, this Court found the contention that section 27-12-89 was an
unconstitutional

taking

of property

without

compensation

"entirely without merit and need not be addressed."
Martinr 916 P.2d 910, 912 n.l (Utah App. 1996).

was

Kohler v.

The State believes

the current challenge is without merit as well.

Regardless of

whether the case is analyzed under the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution or article 1, section 22 of the Utah

1

Under Avis, those who claim operation of a statute
results in a taking of their property bear the burden of
demonstrating the unreasonableness of the time frame prescribed
in the statute. 837 P.2d at 587. Appellees here have made no
effort to shoulder this burden.
4

Constitution, no taking has occurred, and the statute is constitutional.
A.

U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 22.
Fifth Amendment Analysis

The United States Supreme Court has held that a similar
statute was not a taking under the Fifth Amendment.

In Texacor

Inc. f v. Shortf 454 U.S. 516 (1982) , the Court held that a statute
which authorized the forfeiture of a mineral estate to the surface
owner for a failure by the mineral estate owner to assert a claim
in a timely fashion was not a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The Court stated that, M[i]n ruling that private property may be
deemed to be abandoned and to lapse upon the failure of its owner
to take reasonable actions imposed by law, this Court has never
required the State to compensate the owner for the consequences of
his own neglect." IdL at 530. Nolan v. California Coastal Commfnr
438 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigardr 512 U.S. 374
(1994), are inapplicable to sections 27-12-89 or -90 because the
Utah statutes do not require forced dedication of property.

As

Appellees state in their brief, both Dolan and Nolan involve forced
dedication.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES at 20. Section 27-12-89 does not

compel any landowner to dedicate property to the public. Rather,
it defines when a dedication has occurred after a period of
inactivity.

As the United States Supreme Court said in Texaco;

From an early time, this Court has recognized that States
have the power to permit unused or abandoned interests in
property to revert to another after the passage of time.
In Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 8 L.Ed. 190,
the Court upheld a Kentucky statute that prevented a
landowner from recovering property on which the defendant
had resided for more than seven years under a claim of
right. The court stated:
5

Such laws have frequently passed in review
before this
Court; and occasions have
occurred, in which they have been
particularly noticed as laws not to be impeached on
the ground of violating private right. What
right has any one to complain, when a reasonable time has been given him, if he has not
been vigilant in asserting his rights?
454 U.S. at 526 (citation omitted).
In sum, the precedents are clear:

when a statute allows for

the lapse of a private property interest absent some reasonable
action taken by the property owner, failure to take that action can
lead to forfeiture of the property.

Such a forfeiture does not

constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.
B.

Art. 1, Section 22 Analysis
The analysis under article 1, section 22 and the Fifth

Amendment is quite similar. See, e.g., Strawberry Elec. v. Spanish
Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996); Baaford v. Ephraim Cityr
904 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Utah 1995).

However, the Utah Supreme Court

said in Strawberry that, "article I, section 22 protects all
property protected by its federal counterpart, and perhaps even
more so due to its more expansive language."
(citation omitted)(emphasis added).

918 P.2d at 877

Because, theoretically, the

property interest involved here may be of the type not protected by
the

Fifth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution—but

protected by article 1, section 22 of the Utah Constitution—the
State will analyze the constitutionality of section 27-12-89 under
the Utah Constitution as well.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Strawberry that, "[u]nder
article I, section 22, the takings analysis has two principle
6

steps.

First, the claimant must demonstrate "some protectible

interest in property.•

If the claimant possesses a protectable

interest, the claimant must then show that the interest has been
"taken or damaged1 by government action."

918 P.2d at 877 (cita-

tions omitted).
Section 27-12-89 does not violate article 1, section 22
because after ten years of dedication a landowner cannot meet
either prong of the test.

A landowner that has allowed a road to

be used for ten years by the general public has allowed her ability
to restrict access to lapse.

The United States Supreme Court in

Texacof Inc. f v. Shortr 454 U.S. 516 (1982), made it clear the
lapsing of a property right requires no compensation.
530.

454 U.S. at

From its inception, Utah has recognized that property rights

may lapse due to a failure to assert those rights.

Section 27-12-

89 functions similarly to the common law doctrines of adverse
possession, boundary by acquiescence and prescriptive easement.2
These doctrines share a similar characteristic—the failure of a
landowner to assert her right to property may result in the
forfeiture of her right.

In Utah, "the use of land by a non-owner

is presumed to be adverse." Green v. Stansfieldr 886 P.2d 117, 120
(Utah App. 1994) (citing Lunt v. Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 260 P.2d
2

The three doctrines are well ingrained in Utah law.
"Boundary by acquiescence has long been recognized in Utah. It
was first mentioned in Suitzgable v. Worseldine, 5 Utah 315, 15
P. 144 (1887), but was held inapplicable in that case." Hales v.
Frakesf 600 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1979). "Rights of easement by
prescription have at all times been recognized in Utah."
Anderson v. Osguthorpe, 29 Utah 2d. 32, 35, 504 P.2d 1000, 1002
(Utah 1972). The doctrine of adverse possession is codified at
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-6 (1996).
7

535, 537 (1953)).

Thus, a landowner's failure to prevent the

adverse use of her land provides a basis for a finding that her
interest in the land has lapsed.
Appellees concede in their MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS1 MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION that "the constitutionality of Section 27-12-89 does not seem to have been challenged in
the one hundred plus years of its existence."

Id. at 15.

Utah

asserts this is because common law allows for the lapsing of
property rights without compensation from the State.

Thus, the

reasoning of Texaco, supra, applies under both the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the
Utah Constitution—no protectable interest in property could have
been "taken" because that interest had lapsed.
Even if the Court finds a protectable property interest
exists, thus allowing Appellees to satisfy the first prong of the
takings test, Appellees cannot meet the second prong:

"If the

claimant possesses a protectable interest, the claimant must then
show that the interest has been "taken or damaged1 by government
action."

Strawberryr 918 P.2d at 877 (citations omitted).

The

finding that a property interest has been taken is logically
inconsistent with the finding that a public road has been "dedicated and abandoned" to the public as section 27-12-89 requires.
In Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1996), this Court
held, "we require that the dedication of property to the public be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.

8

Thus, the law does not

lightly allow the transfer of property from private to public use."
916 P.2d at 913.
Where a road has been "dedicated" to the public by operation
of law under section 27-12-89, it has been abandoned by the
landowner and transferred to the public.
cannot be both transferred

A property interest

to the public by the landowner and

from the landowner by the government.

taken

The finding by a Court that

a road has been dedicated to the public, in other words, precludes
a finding that the road was "taken." Thus, section 27-12-89 cannot
be unconstitutional under article I, section 22 because it never
"takes" a property interest from a private landowner.

The require-

ment that the "dedication" be demonstrated by "clear and convincing"
evidence provides additional protection for the landowner.
In

sum,

section

27-12-89

is constitutional

because any

protectable property interest in the property has either lapsed or
no "taking" of a protectable property interest has occurred because
the property has been "dedicated and abandoned" to the public by
operation of law.
The analysis of section 27-12-90 is even more simple.

If

section 27-12-89 is valid, where it applies to the facts of a given
situation the landowner no longer has a protectable property
interest in the road.

The road is a public highway "until aban-

doned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having
jurisdiction over any such highway, or by other competent authority." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-90 (1995).

9

Thus, the challenge on a

"takings" theory of section 27-12-90 fails on the first prong of
Strawberry.

918 P.2d at 877.

POINT II. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT HAS HELD
THAT A STATUTE CREATING PUBLIC HIGHWAYS
IS NOT A "TAKING"
In a case similar to this one, the Colorado Supreme Court in
Bd. of County Commfrs v. Flickinaer. 687 P.2d 975 (1984), relying
heavily on Texacof Inc. (discussed in Point I, supra), held that a
variety of recreational and apparently related uses by governmental
authorities was adequate to establish a public road and that the
county did not have to pay compensation for the road dedication.
687 P. 2d at 984.3

The Colorado statute read in pertinent part,

M

"[a]ll roads over private lands that have been used adversely

without interruption or objection on the part of the owners of such
lands for twenty consecutive years1 are declared to be public
highways."

687 P.2d at 980.

Thus, except for the twenty-year requirement, the Colorado
statute is very similar to section 27-12-89, which states that w[a]
highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public
The State does not agree with the district court's
analysis in this case that the use of a road for solely
recreational purposes cannot establish a public road. The
Supreme Court has stated that w[t]he determination that a roadway
has been continuously used by members of the general public for
at least ten years is the sole requirement for it to become a
public road." Thurman v. Byramf 626 P. 2d 447, 449 (Utah
1981)(emphasis added). Thus, the use of a road for recreational
purposes by the general public, especially in rural areas of
Utah, may be sufficient to establish a public road.
10

thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89
(1995).
In Flickingerf the Colorado Supreme Court found that the
Flickingers were aware that "the public had used the road in
traveling to nearby hunting, fishing and picnicking areas and that
governmental employees had also used it to gain access to adjacent
federal lands." 687 P.2d. at 980. The Court relied heavily on the
reasoning of Texacor Inc., suprar and said, "[t]his case is not
analytically distinguishable from Texacor Inc.

Charles Flickinger

originally had a fee interest in the private road across his
property, subject to certain conditions imposed by state law." 687
P. 2d at 984.

The State of Utah believes the case at bar is

analytically indistinguishable from Texacor Inc.

Thus, the State

urges this Court to adopt the rest of the reasoning of the Colorado
Supreme Court.

It stated that the effect of the Colorado statute

[S]imply to require an owner desirous of retaining his
interest in property that he knows is subjected to
continuous public use to prohibit such public use or to
make manifest his objection to it. The State of Colorado
clearly has the power to condition the ownership of an
interest in property upon compliance with conditions that
impose such a slight burden on the owner. The failure .
. . resulted in the loss of their interest in the road as
a private road and in the creation of a public highway,
with the result [that the creation of the public highway]
did not constitute a governmental taking for which
compensation was required.
687 P.2d at 984-85.
Similarly, the State believes that the slight burden placed on
landowners by section 27-12-89 to avoid abandonment of their

11

property interests is not an unconstitutional "taking" without
compensation.

CQEC&USSON
Sections 27-12-89 and -90 do not violate either the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section
22 of the Utah Constitution.

The statutes are consistent with a

long-established legal principle:
cause the right to lapse.

failure to exercise a right may

The public thoroughfare statute is

similar to the doctrines of prescriptive easement, boundary by
acquiescence, and adverse possession.

These doctrines recognize

the lapsing of a property interest without compensation due to a
landowner's failure to assert a right.

The United States Supreme

Court has repeatedly found such forfeiture statutes to be constitutionally sound.
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that operation of
a similar statute does not amount to a "taking."

The State urges

the Utah Court of Appeals to elaborate upon its footnote in Kohler
v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 912 n.l (Utah App. 1996), and find that
sections 27-12-89 and -90 are constitutionally sound as well.

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of April, 1998.
JAN GRAHAM, #1231
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

Norman K. Johnson #3816
Daniel G. Moquin #7585
12

Assistant Attorneys General
1594 West North Temple, #300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116
Telephone: (801) 583-7227
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of April, 1998, two (2)
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT BOX ELDER COUNTY were
mailed, first class postage prepaid, to:
Jon J. Bunderson
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John Sorge
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Bruce R. Baird
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NORMA CAMPBELL, LAMONT
CAMPBELL and THE CAMPBELL
CATTLE COMPANY, a Utah General
Partnership,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 960000248 PR

vs.

BOX ELDER COUNTY,
Judge Ben Hadfield
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT is whether plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment should be granted based on their argument that Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 is
unconstitutional because it authorizes the taking of property without just compensation in
violation of both the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Article I, section 22 of the Utah
Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 provides that
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
period often years.
L Presumption of Constitutionality
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that where the constitutionality of a statute is at issue,
courts have "a special responsibility to exercise a high degree of caution and restraint to keep
themselves within the limitations of the judicial power in order not to infringe upon the
prerogatives of the . . . legislative branch)*]." Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806 (Utah 1974).

Consistent with this policy, it is a well-established principle that
statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and will not be invalidated if, resolving
every reasonable doubt in favor of their constitutionality, there is any reasonable
basis upon which they can be sustained. . . [Moreover,] the Court is obligated to
adopt any reasonable construction of a statute that will assure its constitutionality
in preference to any construction that would jeopardize it.
Matheson v. Perry, 641 P.2d 674, 699 (Utah 1982) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting).
Thus, when examining the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, such as § 27-12-89, u[t]he
primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of
the purposes the statute was meant to achieve." Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah
1991).
H. "Abandonment" and "Dedication"
Key components of the statute in question are the terms "abandoned" and "dedicated." An
"[abandonment is the relinquishment of property rights with the intent to terminate ownership."
Averett v. Utah County Drainage Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 428, 430 (Utah App. 1988). Although
the intent to abandon must be clear and unequivocal, see Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755
P.2d 750, 753 (Utah 1988), this "intention need not be shown by the positive testimony of the
[owner] but may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the [owner], which are clearly
inconsistent with an intention to continue the use of the property." Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617
P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 1980).
A dedication is "[t]he appropriation of land . . . by the owner[] for the use of the public
and accepted for such use by or on behalf of the public." Black's Law Dictionary 412 (6th ed.
1990). Thus, a formal "[dedication requires two elements. First, the owner must express in a
positive and unmistakable manner the intention to dedicate his property to public use. Second,
2

there must be . . . an express or implied public acceptance of the property offered for dedication."
Mackv. Edens, 464 S.E.2d 124, 126 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). See also Gillmor v. Carter, 391 P.2d
426, 428 (Utah 1964) (u[T]here must be evidence of intent by the owner to dedicate a road to a
public use and an acceptance by the public"). However, although intent to offer and acceptance
by the public are necessary elements of a dedication, formalities exhibiting intent by the owner to
dedicate property or the public's acceptance are not essential. See Town of Benton v. Peoples
Bank of Polk County, 904 S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) ("Both the offer of dedication
and the public acceptance thereof may be expressed or implied."). Like abandonment, Utah case
law specifically permits the owner's intent to be "inferred from declarations, acts or circumstances
and user by the general public." Gillmor v. Carter, 391 P.2d at 428. Moreover, "acceptance
could be inferred under some circumstances from the action and use of the public generally
without any action of the body charged with the repair of the public roads." Mason v. State, 656
P.2d 465, 470-71 (Utah 1982) (Howe, J. concurring). Thus, whether exhibited by express
formalities or inferred from the circumstances of the case, land is "dedicated" whenever there is an
intentional concession made on the part of a landowner that his property, or a portion of it, be
appropriated for use by the public and the public accepts this offer.
m . Highway by Use and Implied Dedication
Many, if not most, states, either by statute or common law, permit private roads to be
transformed into public highways whenever the general public has used the road continuously
over a certain period of time.1 The justification for permitting the public to acquire a

See the Appendix for a selective list of states which permit private roads to be transformed into public highways
where the general public has used the road continuously over a defined period of time.
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right-of-way in this manner is grounded in the common law principle of implied dedication. See
Pitts v. Roberts, 562 P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1977) ("An implied dedication will be presumed from
continuous use by the public of a roadway, as a public thoroughfare."). The appropriation of a
private road for public use may be implied in either of two ways: "Dedication by adverse user has
been characterized as dedication implied by law, while a dedication inferred from the acts of the
owner or from his acquiescence in public user may be termed a dedication implied in fact" See
Union Transportation Co. v. Sacramento County, 267 P.2d 10, 13 (Cal. 1954). See also Bonner
v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646, 652 (Utah 1966) (Callister, J. dissenting) ("A dedication rests primarily
ia*the intent of the owner .. . which may be . . . inferred from circumstances.").
A. Dedication Implied in Fact
A dedication implied in fact, where a landowner's intent to dedicate property is inferred
from his conduct and the circumstances of the case, "operates on the principle of estoppel: 'The
act or acts must be such that the intention may be inferred, or the owner estopped from denying
an intention to dedicate his property to the public use." Merrit v. Peet, 24 N.W.2d 757, 762
(Iowa 1946). See also Agnew v. Haskell, 692 P.2d 650, 651 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (public way by
implied dedication "is based on the principle that, having by their conduct indicated their intention
that the road be used for and by the public, they are estopped to deny a dedication."). Thus, as
with abandonment, an intention to dedicate property for use by the public does not have to be
shown by the owner's positive testimony. See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097,
1099 (Utah 1995) ("It is not necessary to prove that the owner of the private road had the intent
to offer the road to the public"). Accord Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639
P.2d 211, 212 (Utah 1981); Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981). The rationale
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for this is that the issue of whether property has been dedicated "cannot rest entirely upon what
the owner says was his intent. In case controversy arises he can always avow that his intent was
in accord with his interest." Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d at 648. However, this does not mean
that "intent" is irrelevant to a determination of an implied dedication. Indeed, general case law
indicates that a landowner's offer or intention to dedicate private property for use by the public
may be inferred from the owner's acts or omissions, as well as the surrounding circumstances of
the case, so long as these acts or omissions are inconsistent with any other interpretation but that
he intended to have his property appropriated for public use. For example,
[i]f.. . a person throws open a passage through his land, and makes no effort to
prohibit persons from passing through it, and does not show by any visible sign
that he wishes to preserve hisrightover it, his action is a manifestation of an
intention to dedicate the highway to public use and he is presumed to have so
dedicated it.
Conway v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County, 237 A.2d 9, 11 (Md.
1968). Finally, "c[t]he intention of the owner of the land to dedicate may be inferredfromhis
acquiescence in its continual use as a road by the public.'" Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d at 449.
See also Re-Open Ramblat Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 825 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (intention may be "inferredfromthe owner's long acquiescence in a public use of the
property under circumstances which negative the idea that the use was under a license' or from
adverse and continuous use."); Hall v. North Ogden City, 175 P.2d 703, 711 (Utah 1946)
(intention may be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances and where owner acts in
manner as to be estopped from denying such intention).
B. Dedication Implied by Law
An alternative form of implied dedication relied upon by many states is dedication implied
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by law or implied dedication by prescription. Dedication by prescription occurs by operation of
law from the public's adverse use of the owner's property. The test for determining whether a
private road has been (impliedly) dedicated by prescription is the same as the test for a private
prescriptive easement:
[t]he evidence must establish [that]... the public's use [was] adverse, under a
claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted, [and] with the knowledge of the
owner but without his consent. . . .Where the road has been shown to have been
openly and notoriously used as an open public highway in common by all the
people for the statutory period, it will be considered a public highway.
Town of Deer Creek Road District v. Hancock, 555 N.E.2d 1147, 1148 (111. App. Ct 1990). See
also Primark, Inc. v. Burien Gardens Associates, 823 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
("In order to establish a highway by prescription, the public use of the way must be general,
adverse, uninterrupted and continuous for a period of 10 years under claim ofright.");State v.
Meyer, 361 N.W.2d 221, 223 (N.D. 1985) ("[T]o establish a highway by prescription, there must
have been general, continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, and adverse use of the road as a public road
under a claim of right for a period of twenty years.")IV. "Taking" and Implied Dedication
Under both federal and state constitutional law, governmental entities are prohibited from
taking private property for use by the public unless just compensation is paid to the landowner.
See U.S. Const, amend. V and Utah Const., art. I, § 22. Interpreting the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has held that a taking occurs whenever the
government "authorizes a compelled physical invasion of [private] property." Key v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1528 (1992) (emphasis added). See also Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Counsel, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (taking
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occurs when government actions "compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his
property.") (emphasis added). Under Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, a "taking" is
"any substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value,
or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or
destroyed." Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 11 P. 849, 852 (1904). Based on these
characterizations, a "taking" is composed of at least two key elements:
(1) There must be a physical invasion of or substantial interference with private property
as a result of government action; and
(2) The occupation or interference must be compulsory, that is, without the consent of
the landowner.
Whenever a taking occurs, the landowner is due just compensation for the appropriated
property. See Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah 1990) ("Only when
governmental action rises to the level of a taking or damage under article I, section 22 is the State
required to pay compensation.").
Both dedications implied in fact as well as dedications implied by law are inconsistent with
the concept of a "taking." First, dedications implied by law, or by prescriptive use, are no more a
taking than a prescriptive easement or adverse possession is stealing. With respect to these latter
two doctrines, Utah real property law sanctions these types of otherwise unlaw fid takings of land
belonging to someone else, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-9 to 12, on the ground that where one
makes non-permissive use of another's land, and the landowner fails to prevent such use, this
failure constitutes conclusive evidence that the user is therightfulowner. See William G.
Ackerman and Shane T. Johnson, Outlaws of the Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription
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and Adverse Possession, 31 Land & Water L. Rev. 79, 86 (1996). In like manner, a dedication
implied by law (prescriptive use), while otherwise an unlawful taking, is not a taking under the
law on the ground that the owner is deemed to have dedicated his property to the public use by
failing to assert his rights when confronted with a non-permissive use by the public.
Second, a dedication implied in fact, which is based on an inference that the owner
intended to dedicate his property to the public use, is also inconsistent with the concept of a
taking. Clearly, an intention by a landowner that a portion of his private property be appropriated
for use by the public is fundamentally at odds with the claim that this property is being taken
without the owner's consent.2 The fact that this intention is inferred from the owner's
acquiescence in the use of the property as a public highway or that the owner presently claims that
his intentions were (and are now) otherwise, is of no moment. What matters under § 27-12-89 is
whether the surrounding facts and circumstances during the time which the public is alleged to
have been using the property as a pubic thoroughfare, justifies an inference that the owner
intended to offer his property for the pubic use. If the statutory period is met and the owner's
intent to dedicate can justifiably be inferred, which is all § 27-12-89 permits, then the property is
deemed to be dedicated and the owner is estopped from claiming that his property has been taken
without his consent.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs in this case support their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by asserting
that § 27-12-89 permits, or results in, the taking of private property without just compensation in
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Intention and consent are conceptually related. If one intends a certain outcome, it necessarily follows that the
outcome is consented to. Thus, intending that land be appropriated for use by the public entails that the public's use of
the land has been consented to by the landowner.
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violation of the Fifth Amendment and the Utah Constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
However, implied dedications of private property to the public use are inconsistent with the
notion of an unconstitutional taking.
On the one hand are dedications implied by law which deem property to be dedicated for
public use based on principles of prescription and adverse possession. Since these principles do
not, both historically and by statute, amount to an illegal appropriation of property, it follows that
implied dedications by prescription are inconsistent with an unconstitutional taking.
On the other hand are dedications implied in fact, which are crucial to a determination of
rights under § 27-12-89. Based on this model of implied dedication, § 27-12-89 deems property
to have been dedicated if, and only if, the owner's intent to so dedicate his property can justifiably
be inferred from his acquiescence in allowing the public to use his road for the statutory period of
ten years. Since intending to offer one's property for use by the public is inconsistent with taking
the property without consent, § 27-12-89 does not run afoul of the takings provisions of the Fifth
Amendment and the Utah State Constitution. Therefore, § 27-12-89 is not unconstitutional.3
The plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby denied.
DATED this

/^

of February, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

'V<*>/ *"

BEN H. HADFIELD
FIRST DISTRICT CO
3

Ncithcr the Utah Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals has specifically addressed the constitutionality of Utah
Code Ann. § 27-12-89. However, it does appear that a constitutional argument has been raised before the Court of
Appeals, but was summarily dismissed. In doing so, the Court made the following comment: "We do not address
Martin's argument[] regarding... the alleged violation of Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution
[T]he
argument regarding the unconstitutional taking is entirely withoutihCnt aUtf-fleejd not be addressed." Kohkr v. Mar^n,
916 R2d-9-te, 912 n. 1 (Utah App. 1995).
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APPENDIX
Selected List of States with Some Form of Highway by Use Law
Statutory Highway by Use States
Colorado, C.R.S.A. § 43-2-201. Public Highways
(1) The following are declared to be public highways:
(c) All roads over private lands that have been used adversely without permission or
objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty consecutive years.
Idaho, I.C. § 40-109. Definitions
(5) "Highways" means . . . all roads used as such for a period offive(5) years, provided
they shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public.
Illinois, Il.C.S. § 5/2-202. Highway
Highway—any public way for vehicular travel which has been . . . established by
dedication, or used by the public as a highway for 15 years.
Michigan, M.C.L. §221.20
All highways regularly established in pursuance of existing laws, all roads that shall have
been used as such for 10 years or more, whether any record or other proof exists that they
were ever established as highways or not. . . shall be deemed public highways, subject to
be altered or discontinued according to the provisions of this act.
New York, Highway Law § 189
All lands which shall have been used by the public as a highway for the period often years
or more, shall be a highway, with the same force and effect as if it had been duly laid out
and recorded as a highway, and the town superintendent shall open all such highways to
the width of at least three rods.
Nevada, N.R.S. § 405.191. "Public road" defined
2. [Pjublic use alone has been and is sufficient to evidence an acceptance of the grant of a
public user right of way pursuant to former 43 U.S C. § 932.
North Dakota, N.D.C.C. § 24-07-01
All public roads and highways within this State which have been or which shall be open
and in use as such, during twenty successive years, are public roads or highways whether
or not they have been laid out, established, and opened lawfully.
Washington, R.C.W.A. § 36 75.080 Highways used ten years are county roads
All public highways in this state, outside incorporated cities and towns and not designated
as state highways which have been used as public highways for a period of not less than
ten years are county roads.

Common Law Highway by Use States
Alaska
Dillingham Commercial Co., Inc. v. City of Dillingham, 705 P.2d 410 (Alaska 1985).
California
Re-Open Rambla, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
Iowa
Aferrit v. Feet, 24 N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 1946).
Maryland
Conway v. Board of County Commissionersfor Prince George's County, 237 A. 2d 9
(Md. Ct. App. 1968).
Missouri
Selby v. Day, 929 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
Oregon
Agnew v. Haskell, 692 P.2d 650 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
South Carolina
Mackv. Edens, 464 S.E.2d 124 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
Tennessee
Town of Benton v. Peoples Bank of Polk County, 904 S.W.2d 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
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